• Growing Migration Inequality: What do the Global Data Actually Show?

World Migration Report 2024: Chapter 4

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Chapter 4
Growing Migration Inequality: What do the Global Data Actually Show?

Concepts and Context

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There has been considerable research and enquiry over many decades into the reasons underpinning migration, both internal and international, stretching back in the modern era as far as the 1880s.10 Ongoing examination of migration drivers and factors principally involves attempts to explain migration patterns as well as the structures and processes that influence and shape the movement of people from one country to another. As a result, there is a substantial body of research and analysis on the determinants of international migration that has identified multiple factors underpinning migration patterns and processes, including those related to economics and trade, social and cultural links, demography and demographic change, and safety and protection, as well as geography and proximity. 11

There has been a considerable focus on agency and structure, and how people contemplating migration navigate through a range of “intervening obstacles”, with the number and nature of those obstacles being related to human capability in the context of development.12 While the populist view remains that so-called “economic migrants” are active in their pursuit of migration and exercise a considerable degree of agency, this is too simplistic. While acknowledging long-term evidence reflected in academic outputs on the political economy of migration, research and analysis in more recent decades has, for example, found wide variation in the ability of labour migrants to make choices, depending on the policy constraints and options they face; these constraints include conditions of bonded labour, as well as labour migration that involves people trading off their rights in pressurized environments.13 For example, the extent to which labour migrants are able to exercise self-agency and choose aspects of their migration can be heavily circumscribed, although in most circumstances some choice remains, including as to whether to migrate, where to migrate, how to migrate, and whether or when to return home.14 Nevertheless, the ability of (potential) migrants to exercise choice in international migration can be extremely limited, depending on where they were born and the circumstances in which they live.

Migration and the lottery of birth

Examining the overall quality of life by country, and the ability to migrate in terms of visa access, reveals that availability of migration options is partly related to the lottery of birth and in particular the national passport of the potential migrant. For instance, some nationality groups appear to be much less likely to have access to visas and visa-free arrangements.15 Table 1 below summarizes global indices of human development (see Appendix A for a discussion of the Human Development Index), fragility and visa access for selected countries.16 The Passport Index, a global ranking of countries according to the entry freedom of their citizens,17 reveals for example that an individual’s ability to enter a country with relative ease is in many respects determined by nationality. Entry access also broadly reflects a country’s status and relations within the international community and indicates how stable, safe and prosperous it is in relation to other countries. The data also show two other aspects: that there are some significant differences between highly ranked human development countries and others; and that mid-ranked development countries can be significant source, transit and destination countries simultaneously. Nationals from countries with very high levels of human development can travel visa free to most other countries worldwide.18 These countries are also significant and preferred destination countries.19 Toward the bottom of the table, however, the entry restrictions in place for these countries indicate that regular migration pathways are problematic for citizens. Irregular pathways are likely to be the most realistic (if not the only) option open to potential migrants from these countries. It is also important to note that low HDI countries are also much more likely to have large populations of internally displaced persons and/or to be origin countries of large numbers of refugees.20

 

 

Table 1. Human development, fragility and passport rankings for selected countries
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Sources: UNDP, Human Development Index 2019 (Human Development Report 2020); Henley & Partners, Passport Index 2021
(The Henley Passport Index 2021, Q2); The Fund for Peace Fragile States Index 2020.
Note: Data were the latest available at the time of writing.

 

 

We also know, however, that nationality alone does not account for evolving migration patterns, as visa and mobility policy settings are one (albeit important) factor in explaining who migrates and where people migrate over time. Within the context of the broader discussions on migration drivers and the development of discernible migration patterns over recent years and decades, models to explain migration, as shown in  Figure 2, seek to account for both structural aspects and migrants’ agency.

 

 

Figure 2. A model of the mechanisms that produce migration
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Source: Carling, 2017.

 

Importantly, this model recognizes that a desire for change does not necessarily result in a desire to migrate, and that where it does exist, a desire to migrate does not necessarily result in migration – the existence of migration infrastructure21 (or lack thereof) is an important factor in migration outcomes, with migration infrastructure defined as diverse human and non-human elements that enable and shape migration (e.g. migration “agents” operating commercially, including smugglers; regulatory regimes and policy frameworks; technological aspects such as ICT and transport; and transnational social networks).22

As part of this migration infrastructure, the (in)ability to access a visa can be profoundly important, not least because it is the one element that has not radically expanded over time, unlike the marked growth in “agents”, ICT, transport and connected networks.23 On the contrary, recent analysis shows that visa access has resulted in a bifurcation of mobility, with citizens of wealthy countries much more able to access regulated mobility regimes than those from poor countries.24 This is important because, wherever possible, migrants will opt to migrate through regular pathways on visas.25 There are stark differences between travelling on a visa and travelling unauthorized without a visa. From a migrant’s perspective, the experience can be profoundly different in a number of important ways that can impact on the migrant as well as his/her family, including those who may remain in the origin country. First, visas denote authority to enter a country and so offer a form of legitimacy when arriving in and travelling through a country. A valid visa provides a greater chance of being safeguarded against exploitation. Conversely, travelling without a visa puts people at much greater risk of being detained and deported by authorities, or exploited and abused by those offering illicit migration services, such as smugglers or traffickers, and having to operate largely outside of regulated systems.26 Second, travelling on visas is undoubtedly much easier logistically, as the availability of travel options is far greater. In some cases, it can mean the difference between a journey being feasible or not. Third, visas provide a greater level of certainty and confidence in the journey, which is much more likely to take place as planned, including in relation to costs.27

Unsurprisingly, there is thus often a strong preference for travelling on a visa. Access to visas within decision-making contexts, therefore, features heavily in the minds of potential migrants and has been shown to be a key factor when the possibilities of migrating are explored while in the country of origin.28 In recent research on online job search and migration intentions, for example, the availability of visas was found to be a determining factor in how people conducted online job searches.29 Similarly, changes in visa settings have been found to have an impact on potential migrants’ perceptions of opportunities afforded by migration, as well as their eventual migration.30

The intentions of (potential) migrants as part of individual and collective migrant decision-making processes has been a significant focus of migration research and analysis for many years, and remains of particular interest to scholars and policymakers alike.31 As highlighted in Figure 2 above, intentions do not always result in migration outcomes, and much of the research has adopted a tiered approach to contemplations of migration that involve different stages (such as “desire”, “exploration/planning”, ”preparation” and “down/actual payment”), finding overall that as the process progresses over time, fewer and fewer people are able to maintain their desire and realize their migration intention, and those in the final “payment” category are typically very small in number and proportion.32 Intentions to migrate - even if carefully refined and nuanced – can only take us so far in understanding migration.33

 

Migration and development: mobility transitions and “hump migration”

The significant limitations or obstacles facing people (especially in countries with low levels of human development) in accessing visa regimes to pursue international migration is also reflected in macroeconomic analysis of migration. One line of research on the links between “maturity” of migration and human development, for example, shows that low-income countries have low emigration rates, an explanation being that low income levels are an obstacle in accumulating the funds needed to undertake migration, acknowledging that other factors (e.g. demography) also play a role. 34 Resource consideration is related to the concept of “involuntary immobility”, in which people who would like to migrate internationally are unable to do so for a number of reasons, including costs.35

Further, analysis of the relationship between country income and international migration shows that emigration increases with higher income levels, and that at a certain point, higher incomes enabling increased emigration can then become a stabilizing influence and reduce outward migration. In other words, as GDP per capita increases, emigration initially increases and then decreases. This phenomenon, depicted in Figure 3,36 has been referred to by some analysts as the “mobility transition”.37
 

 

Figure 3: Mobility transition
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Source: Adapted from Clemens, 2014:7–8.
Notes: Clemens found that overall higher economic development (higher income) is associated with reduced emigration. Refer to Clemens (2014) for further discussion of data analysis.
 

 

As shown in Figure 3, Clemens’s analysis estimates that emigration rates start to decrease if countries rise above GDP per capita income levels of USD 7,000–8,000, which at the time of the analysis (using 2005 GDP data) included countries such as Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji and North Macedonia.38 Further, as income levels rise, emigration rates decline, as illustrated by the so-called “migration hump”.39

The interaction of economic development and international migration – or “mobility transitions” – has been of intense interest to researchers and policymakers globally, as it calls into question the commonly held notion that overseas development assistance will act to “stabilize”populations and dampen emigration rates from low-income countries by providing greater opportunities at home.40 Analysts have found that economic development of lowincome countries is positively correlated with emigration: “economic growth has historically raised emigration in almost all developing countries”.41 However, more recent analysis has found that when shorter time periods are examined, the relationship between country income levels and emigration is less clear, with the finding that economic growth in poor countries coincides with less emigration.42 This finding, however, has been hotly contested with the discussion focusing on technical errors in modelling (please see Appendix B for further background).43 Importantly, much of the research and analysis on mobility transitions focuses on emigration from low-income countries, almost certainly due to the preoccupation in policy and academic spheres with (irregular) migration to very high HDI countries.44 

As can be seen from Figure 3, as country income levels rise, emigration decreases, forming a so-called “hump” pattern. However, rather than a migrant “hump” involving a trailing off of emigration rates as incomes rise, a so-called “plateau” has previously been identified by scholars who call into question the notion that emigration rates decline as countries develop over time.45 Others have questioned the time periods applied to theorizing underlying migration dynamics related to “humps” or “mobility transitions”.46 However, as the overall quantity and quality of data related to migrants, human development (including economic indicators), mobility and migration policy improves over time, it is possible that a divergent picture is emerging. One perspective shows that emigration to and from wealthy countries is a key feature of recent migration patterns, while migration from developing countries remains much more limited. This is highlighted in recent analyses, with particular reference to the very wide confidence bands evident in Figure 4, meaning that we cannot be certain that emigration declines with higher incomes; however, emigration prevalence is non-linear (meaning that there is not a straightforward positive relationship between emigration rates and country income levels).

 

 

Figure 4. Emigration prevalence, 1960 to 2019
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Source: Clemens, 2020.